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STEPPING BACK TO MOVE FORWARD: EXPANDING
PERSONAL JURISDICTION BY REVIVING OLD PRACTICES
ABSTRACT
This Comment analyzes personal jurisdiction through the lens of BristolMyers Squibb v. Superior Court. Courts have, for years, been split on the
degree of relatedness required between the claim and the defendant’s contacts
with a forum when analyzing specific jurisdiction. While the Supreme Court
recently intervened in an attempt to clarify the issue and articulate a single test
for relatedness, this Comment argues that the Court’s entire personal
jurisdiction framework is flawed. The main problem is an overemphasis on the
defendant’s contact with the forum. The result of this emphasis is that courts
rarely, if ever, consider fairness as a dispositive factor in the analysis. And
when courts try to expand the scope of jurisdiction under this contact-focused
approach, the resulting opinions can be confusing or otherwise flawed.
This Comment argues that the best way to expand the scope of state
personal jurisdiction is to return to a mélange approach, under which each
factor weighing on the overall fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction is
considered alongside the others. This approach has several advantages over
the Court’s current framework. Expanding personal jurisdiction through the
mélange would reduce the resources currently being spent on pre-discovery
litigation, and would allow more cases to move forward past the pleading
stage and closer to being resolved on their merits. Reducing litigation costs
would in turn encourage access to courts. Furthermore, because the mélange
considers the forum state’s interest in adjudicating a case as a coequal factor,
it encourages courts to consider the role of states as separate sovereigns.
Finally, the mélange would promote a fairness-based view of due process by
making fairness the central question to be asked and answered in every
personal jurisdiction case.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2012, eight complaints were filed in a San Francisco Superior
Court, each alleging the same thirteen causes of action against the same
defendant.1 The plaintiffs were 678 individuals, each of whom had been
prescribed and had taken the drug Plavix.2 Their complaints alleged injuries
resulting from having taken the drug.3 The defendant was Bristol-Myers
Squibb Company (BMS), the manufacturer of Plavix.4 BMS is not a small
company; it employs a workforce of over 12,000, maintains research facilities
in California, and in California alone sold $918 million worth of Plavix over a
six-year period.5 BMS moved to quash service of process on the grounds that
California lacked personal jurisdiction with respect to the nonresident
plaintiffs’ claims.6 The Superior Court denied the motion, and BMS appealed.7
The issue was whether the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims arose from BMS’s
contacts with California.8 Only eighty-six of the plaintiffs reside in California;
the rest were spread across thirty-three other states.9 The 592 plaintiffs who did
not reside in California (the nonresident plaintiffs) were all injured by drugs
they took outside California.10 Furthermore, BMS did not manufacture those
drugs in California, and the drugs did not even pass through California while
being distributed to the nonresident plaintiffs.11 For these 592 plaintiffs, the
connection between their claims and BMS’s activities in California would
appear nonexistent. The California Supreme Court disagreed, and in August
2016 held that jurisdiction was proper in California.12

1

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 877 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773

(2017).
2

Id. at 877–78. Plavix is prescribed “to inhibit blood clotting.” Id. at 878.
Id. The injuries included, inter alia, bleeding, heart attack, stroke, hematoma, and death. Id.
4
Id. at 877–78. The plaintiffs named a second defendant, McKesson Corporation. Id. at 878.
McKesson did not allege that California lacked personal jurisdiction over it because it is headquartered in the
state. See id. at 893.
5
Id. at 879.
6
Id. at 878.
7
Id. at 879.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 878.
10
Id. at 878–79.
11
Id. at 879.
12
Id. at 878.
3
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Why was Bristol-Myers Squibb notable? Because it was one of the first
cases to address specific jurisdiction since Daimler AG v. Bauman.13 There, the
Court confirmed a shift in general jurisdiction jurisprudence that it had begun
in 2011.14 Prior to 2011, courts analyzed general jurisdiction as a question of
whether a defendant had “continuous and systematic” contacts with a forum
state.15 In 2011, the Court qualified this test to establish the current standard;
now the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render [it] essentially at home in the forum.”16 Daimler clarified this standard.
Generally a corporation will be “at home” only in the states where the
corporation is incorporated and where it has its principal place of business.17
While Daimler severely limited general jurisdiction, it also hinted at an
expanding role for specific jurisdiction.18 Commenters and attorneys noticed
this hint, and now seek ways to expand specific jurisdiction.19 Because the
nonresident plaintiffs could not directly trace their injuries to BMS’s California
activities,20 Bristol-Myers Squibb presented an opportunity to try such an
expansion. Unfortunately, this opportunity would be short-lived.21
Why focus on expanding the scope of specific jurisdiction when courts are
already swarming with litigants?22 Because litigating jurisdiction wastes both
judicial and party resources at the pleading stage, before a dispute can be

13
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). For more on the Daimler opinion, see generally Bernadette B. Genetin, The
Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. REV. 107 (2015) (discussing the Court’s
narrowing of the scope of general jurisdiction).
14
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011).
15
See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 123–24
(2001) (discussing the “continuous and systematic” standard).
16
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
17
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)). The Court referred to these locations as the “paradigm forums” for general
jurisdiction; hence for a corporation to be “at home” elsewhere will be the exception. See Genetin, supra note
13, at 140.
18
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.10 (claiming that specific jurisdiction has “flourished” in recent
decades); see also Genetin, supra note 13, at 136–37.
19
See, e.g., Genetin, supra note 13, at 112 (arguing for an approach that assesses first whether the
defendant has any contacts with the forum and second whether jurisdiction would be reasonable); Charles W.
“Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 207, 230–35 (2014) (discussing relatedness as a means to refine specific jurisdiction analysis).
20
See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
21
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (rejecting an expansive view
of specific jurisdiction).
22
One major trend over the last several decades has been the tremendous growth in the number of civil
filings. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1839, 1859–61 (2014) (discussing this growth).
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resolved on its merits.23 Making jurisdiction easier to establish would
streamline litigation by avoiding lengthy disputes at the pleading stage.24 It
would also expand access to the courts and ensure that the injured have an
opportunity to be made whole,25 respect state sovereignty,26 and promote the
fundamental goals of due process fairness.27 These are significant values in the
field of civil procedure beyond just personal jurisdiction; they underpin much
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,28 as well as our American
democracy.29
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the development of the
Court’s approach to personal jurisdiction since 1945, explaining how over time
it moved from an approach that focused on the reasonableness of jurisdiction
to an approach that focused primarily on whether the defendant has any contact
with the forum.30 Part II then discusses how the California Supreme Court
articulated a broad view of the scope of specific jurisdiction and arrived at a
fair result in Bristol-Myers Squibb.31 However, the California Supreme Court’s
reasoning was convoluted, and the Supreme Court eventually reversed it in an
opinion that doubled down on a contacts-centric approach.32 Finally, Part III
concludes that the best way to expand the scope of specific jurisdiction while
avoiding the confusion apparent in the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision is to
return to “the mélange”—an approach to personal jurisdiction that the Supreme
Court last utilized in 1957.33

23
Cf. Arthur R. Miller, Keynote Address, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 465, 477 (2012) (complaining that “important litigation values have been impaired by the erection of
procedural stop signs”).
24
Id.
25
See generally John C. Jeffries Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87
(1999) (discussing the gap that occurs when an individual who has been wronged does not have access to a
remedy in the context of constitutional law).
26
See Allan R. Stein, Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through
the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. L. REV. 411, 415–16, 419–20 (2004) (discussing the relationship
between personal jurisdiction and state sovereignty). But see Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty”
Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 737
(2012) (questioning the analytical value of basing personal jurisdiction in terms of state sovereignty).
27
The Supreme Court has framed personal jurisdiction as an extension of due process since 1877. See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
28
See Miller, supra note 23, at 465–66 (discussing the normative values underlying the Federal Rules);
see also Subrin & Main, supra note 22, at 1856 (discussing the same).
29
See Subrin & Main, supra note 22, at 1889 (“The civil litigation system is a key part of a larger
American political structure.”).
30
See infra Part I.
31
See infra Section II.A.
32
See infra Sections II.B–C.
33
See infra Part III.
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BACKGROUND: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MÉLANGE

The modern distinction between specific and general personal jurisdiction
can be traced back to the Court’s decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.34 In that case, the Court departed from nearly seventy years of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—which had focused on the territorial
boundaries of the states as the guideposts for constitutional exercises of
jurisdiction35—in favor of a more liberal interpretation.36 After International
Shoe, the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction no longer depended on the
defendant’s consent to jurisdiction or presence in the forum. Personal
jurisdiction in a forum would satisfy due process so long as the defendant had
“certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”37 This
language has vexed courts, commentators, and first-year law students for
decades, as the court has moved from an analytical framework that considered
fairness alongside contacts to one that now considers solely contacts.38
A. The Rise of the Mélange
As other commentators have noted, the Court’s earliest applications of the
International Shoe test followed what can best be called a reasonableness—or
mélange—approach.39 This approach focused on answering one short question:
Would personal jurisdiction be reasonable, or fair, in this case? Following this
approach, the Court would weigh each factor relevant to personal

34

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (noting that with few exceptions “[t]he authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established”). Pennoyer
also marked the innovation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on a state’s authority to exercise
jurisdiction over nonresidents. See id. at 733–34 (discussing the Due Process Clause’s applicability to personal
jurisdiction); see also Perdue, supra note 25, at 730 (noting that Pennoyer “introduced the Due Process Clause
into personal jurisdiction doctrine”).
36
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17 (recognizing that the marker of constitutional exercises of
personal jurisdiction is no longer the defendant’s presence within the forum, but rather whether the defendant’s
overall contacts with the forum make the exercise of jurisdiction fair and reasonable).
37
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
38
They even vexed one of the sitting justices at the time. Justice Black, in a separate opinion, expressed
concerns that the minimum contacts language would be used in future decisions to restrict the scope of state
court jurisdiction. Id. at 322–26 (Black, J., concurring).
39
This Comment borrows the term “mélange” from Professor Richard Freer, who uses it to describe the
approach taken by the Court in early post-International Shoe jurisdiction cases, and advocated by Justice
Brennan in dissenting opinions until the early 1980s. Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the TwentyFirst Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 558 (2012) (detailing the rise and
fall of the reasonableness/mélange approach); see also Genetin, supra note 13 (describing the Court’s early
applications of International Shoe as following a “reasonableness” approach).
35
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jurisdiction—the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the case, the nature of
the defendant’s contacts, and the burden on the parties and overall convenience
of litigating in the forum—together to determine whether jurisdiction in the
forum was reasonable in a given case.40 The mélange approach reached its
zenith in the mid-1950s with the cases of Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia,41
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,42 and finally with McGee v.
International Life Insurance.43
In Travelers, the Court upheld Virginia’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a Nebraska nonprofit association that sold health insurance.44 Travelers’
members paid initiation and periodic fees to an office in Omaha, and
recommended the association to prospective new members; the Omaha office
would then mail solicitations to these prospective members.45 This behavior
violated a Virginia blue sky law46 requiring that companies selling certificates
of insurance first obtain a permit from the state.47 After the state initiated a
cease-and-desist proceeding against Travelers, the association moved to quash
service of process for lack of jurisdiction.48 The Virginia courts affirmed and
Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court.49
The Court relied on four factors to uphold personal jurisdiction. First,
Travelers’ contacts with Virginia were not “isolated or short-lived,” but rather
were sufficient to “create continuing obligations between the Association and
each of the many certificate holders in the state.”50 Second, Virginia had a
strong interest in both regulating insurance policies affecting its residents and
ensuring that its blue sky laws were enforced.51 Third, any suits against
Travelers based on Virginia policies would “be more conveniently tried in
Virginia where witnesses would most likely live and where claims for losses

40
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
41
Travelers, 339 U.S. 643.
42
Mullane, 339 U.S. 306.
43
McGee, 355 U.S. 220.
44
Travelers, 339 U.S. at 645, 649.
45
Id. at 645–46.
46
Blue sky laws regulate securities alongside federal regulations. Each state has its own set of these
laws in place to protect investors from, among other things, “fraudulent sales practices and activities” in
securities markets. Fast Answers: Blue Sky Laws, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
answers/bluesky.htm (last updated Oct. 14, 2014).
47
Travelers, 339 U.S. at 644.
48
Id. at 645.
49
Id. at 646.
50
Id. at 648. In fact, Travelers had approximately 800 members in Virginia in 1950. Id. at 646.
51
Id. at 647–48.
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would presumably be investigated.”52 Finally, the Court noted, it would be
unfair to require policyholders to litigate in Nebraska because the value of
individual claims could not justify the travel costs.53
The same year that it issued its opinion in Travelers, the Court briefly
addressed a similar personal jurisdiction challenge in Mullane.54 The question
in Mullane was whether New York could exercise jurisdiction over
nonresident beneficiaries of a trust established under New York law in a
proceeding to settle the trust’s accounts.55 The Court answered this question in
the affirmative through a discussion of the state’s interests:
It is sufficient to observe that . . . the interest of each state in
providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and
are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent and
rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to
determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident . . . .56

In other words, the state’s interest in regulating its trusts justified exercising
jurisdiction over nonresident beneficiaries.
Seven years after making its debut in Travelers and Mullane, the mélange
approach reached its high point in the Court’s unanimous opinion in McGee v.
International Life Insurance, in which the Court held that due process allowed
California to exercise jurisdiction over an insurance company that had a single
contact with the state.57 International Life had mailed a reinsurance certificate
to a California resident and afterward had received payments from that resident
for two years.58 When the resident passed away, his mother obtained a
judgment against International Life in California.59 When she later tried to
enforce the judgment in Texas, International Life challenged California’s
authority to enter the judgment as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.60
Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment and the Court granted
certiorari.61

52

Id. at 649.
Id. at 648–49.
54
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
55
Id. at 309–11.
56
Id. at 313.
57
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
58
Id. at 221–22. The insured had originally purchased insurance from another provider in 1944, but
International Life assumed that provider’s insurance obligations in 1948. Id. at 221.
59
Id. The insured’s mother was the beneficiary of his policy under its terms. Id. at 222.
60
Id. at 221.
61
Id.
53
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The opinion in McGee is brief, with only two paragraphs devoted to
analyzing whether due process allowed International Life to be sued in
California.62 However, in those two paragraphs, the Court touched upon a host
of factors it had previously relied upon in Travelers and Mullane to describe a
broad view of the scope of permissible jurisdiction.63 First and foremost for the
Court was the fact that “the suit was based on a contract which had a
substantial connection with” California; the contract was delivered to
California, the insured was a resident of California, and the insured mailed his
premiums to International Life from California.64 On top of that, the Court
recognized that California had a strong interest in providing a forum for its
residents to hold their insurers accountable,65 and that those residents “would
be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced” to litigate outside California
due to costs.66 The Court observed that its holding was inconvenient for
International Life, but did not give the inconvenience much weight in its
analysis.67
These cases paint a picture of the Court’s early approach to postInternational Shoe personal jurisdiction as focused on answering one question:
Would personal jurisdiction be reasonable, or fair, in this case? In response, the
Court’s opinions had straightforward answers. A state can fairly dispose of a
trust organized under its laws even if beneficiaries resided outside the state.68
A state may conduct proceedings against an insurance association for its
alleged violations of state law.69 It is fair to allow a grieving mother to sue her
son’s insurer in the state where she resides.70 The advantages of this approach
are not limited to the fact that it allowed the Court to seek outcomes that were

62
Id. at 223–24. The two other paragraphs in the opinion’s discussion traced the history of personal
jurisdiction since Pennoyer. Id. at 222–23.
63
Id. at 223–24. What is notable about the McGee opinion, aside from its broad view of the scope of
permissible jurisdiction, is the fact that the Court acknowledged a trend since Pennoyer of expanding personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 222 (“[A] trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental
transformation of our national economy over the years.”).
64
Id. at 223. The Court took a remarkably broad view of jurisdiction, focusing on the relationship
between the lawsuit and the forum rather than the relationship between the defendant and the forum, as later
cases would require. See Freer, supra note 39, at 558.
65
McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
66
Id.
67
See id. at 224 (citing Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)) (“Of course there may
be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but
certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process.”).
68
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
69
See Travelers, 339 U.S. at 649.
70
See McGee, 355 U.S. 220.
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case-specific. By looking at whether, considering everything, jurisdiction was
fair and reasonable, the Court in its early post-International Shoe cases
actively furthered the values of providing individuals with access to courts—
making it more likely that their injuries would be remedied on the merits—
while also respecting the notion of the states as separate sovereigns.71
However, while the Court’s early application of this approach resulted in a
broad expansion of a state’s jurisdictional reach,72 this expansion was not to
last for very long.73
B. The Mélange Takes a Back Seat: Hanson Through Burger King
One year after the mélange approach took center stage in McGee, the Court
pulled the rug out from beneath the mélange’s feet with the opinion in Hanson
v. Denckla. The facts of Hanson recall a connection to the forum state similar
to the one in McGee.74 Mrs. Donner, a Pennsylvania resident, executed a trust
in Delaware in 1935, naming a Delaware company as trustee.75 Mrs. Donner
moved to Florida in 1944; she continued to administer the trust from Florida
and the trustee delivered trust income to her in Florida.76 In 1949, Mrs. Donner
executed a power of appointment over the trust that became the subject of
dispute after Mrs. Donner passed away.77 The dispute over the trust wound up
before the Supreme Court, which was faced with the question of whether
Florida could assert personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.78 The
71
See infra Section III.A.2; cf. Harold S. Lewis Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the
Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 708 (1983)
(arguing that cases since International Shoe evidence a trend away from using state sovereignty to justify
limits on personal jurisdiction). For an example of the Court’s shift away from using state sovereignty to
justify limits on personal jurisdiction, compare World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980) (explaining that due process “acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system”), with Ins. Corp.
of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (noting that due process “represents a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty”). In another
about-face, the Court recently returned to a sovereignty argument. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,
137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (“As we have put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations
on the power of the respective States.’” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958))).
72
See Robert E. Pfeffer, A 21st Century Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 65, 72–
74 (2015) (describing the Court’s early application of International Shoe as “a presumption of jurisdiction so
long as the chosen forum did not appear arbitrary or absurd considering all the factors involved in the
litigation, and the chosen forum did not so burden the defendant that it amounted to a denial of due process”).
73
See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (introducing the “purposeful availment” requirement).
74
Compare id., with McGee, 355 U.S. 220.
75
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238.
76
Id. at 252.
77
Id. at 239–40.
78
Id. at 243.
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Court held that it could not, and in doing so expressly rejected the idea that
McGee suggested a trend towards “the eventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdiction of state courts.”79 To establish the minimum contacts
sufficient to satisfy International Shoe, the Court held, the defendant must
“purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum.”80 Furthermore, while the Delaware trustee interacted with Mrs.
Donner in Florida, it only did so because of her “unilateral activity” of moving
to the state, which the Court concluded was not an example of purposeful
availment.81 Thus, jurisdiction was improper in Florida because the Delaware
trustee lacked minimum contacts with the state.82
Hanson signaled a major shift away from McGee, Mullane, and Travelers.
Rather than considering Florida’s interest in the dispute83 or giving weight to
the litigants’ relative abilities to travel, the Court based its decision solely on
the Delaware trustee’s contact with the forum.84 This fact was not lost on the
dissenters in Hanson,85 who argued that the case should have been decided on
a similar basis as Mullane.86 The dissenters focused their attention on the
nature of the contact between the dispute and Florida.87 Mrs. Donner had not
only executed the power of appointment in Florida, but the beneficiaries most
affected by the dispute resided in Florida as well.88 What appears to have
driven the dissenters’ opinion above all else was the fact that it would not be
“fundamentally unfair” to allow Florida to assert jurisdiction over the
Delaware trustee because the trustee “chose to maintain business relations with
Mrs. Donner in [Florida] for eight years” and maintained regular
communications with her about the trust throughout that relationship.89
79

Id. at 250–51. The majority limited McGee to its facts. See id. at 252.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 251.
83
The Court distinguished Hanson from McGee on this point by noting that California had expressed its
interest by “enact[ing] special legislation” subjecting insurers to jurisdiction, whereas Florida lacked a similar
statute for trustees. Id. at 252; see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 62 n.254 (1990)
(describing the Court’s focus on the statutory differences between Hanson and McGee).
84
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Freer, supra note 39, at 558 (explaining the
defendant-focused nature of the Hanson opinion).
85
Hanson was the first personal jurisdiction case in which Justice Brennan would find himself
dissenting; he would continue to dissent until the 1980s. See generally Freer, supra note 39, at 559–69
(detailing Justice Brennan’s string of dissents).
86
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 260–61 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
87
See id. at 258.
88
Id.
89
Id.
80
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However, a majority of the Court disagreed with this approach, a fact that
would only continue to become clearer over the next decades.
After Hanson, the Court took a break from personal jurisdiction issues until
the late 1970s when it decided a flurry of jurisdiction cases in quick
succession.90 One of those cases, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,91
stands out for two reasons: (1) it signaled another move by the Court further
away from the mélange approach to specific jurisdiction and (2) its facts
presented the Court with an exceptional opportunity to decide questions of
jurisdiction on grounds of overall fairness.
The facts of World-Wide Volkswagen are familiar to even first-year law
students. A family from New York traveling to settle in Arizona was struck by
another driver while driving through Oklahoma; several family members were
severely burned when their car caught fire.92 They filed suit in Oklahoma—
alleging defects in the car’s design that led to a propensity to catch fire—
against, inter alia, the dealership that sold them their car and the distributor
that supplied the dealership.93 Both businesses were incorporated in New York
and conducted all their business in the tristate area.94 The defendants
challenged Oklahoma’s authority to assert personal jurisdiction over them, and
the Court agreed.95
The majority opinion is notable for two reasons. First, the Court provided a
normative explanation for the minimum contacts test: “It protects the
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum[]”
and preserves the status of the states as “coequal sovereigns in a federal
system” by imposing limits on their jurisdictional reach.96 Second, the majority
opinion built upon the test from Hanson by adding an element of foreseeability

90
For an overview of these cases, see Borchers, supra note 83, at 64–72; Freer, supra note 39, at 559–
69; Pfeffer, supra note 72, at 76–93.
91
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
92
Id. at 288. Their injuries were so severe that, at the time of the lawsuit, they were hospitalized in
Oklahoma. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 288 (majority opinion).
94
Id. at 288–89. “Tristate area” refers to areas in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
95
Id. at 287–91.
96
Id. at 292. While the Court has maintained its defendant-focused justification for limits on personal
jurisdiction, the continuing validity of its state sovereignty justification has long been in flux. See Ins. Corp. of
Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”). But see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (returning to a sovereignty justification). See generally Perdue, supra note
26, at 730 (discussing sovereignty concerns in personal jurisdiction analysis).
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to its minimum contacts analysis.97 For a defendant to have purposefully
availed itself of the forum, the Court reasoned that its contact must be such that
it would lead the defendant to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in
the forum.98
While the Court in World-Wide moved further away from a mélange
approach to personal jurisdiction toward one that focused primarily on the
defendant’s contact with the forum, it also gave hope to the idea that courts
may also consider factors related to the overall reasonableness of litigating in
the chosen forum, but only in an “appropriate case.”99 However, as the
outcome in World-Wide demonstrates, it might be easier to find a unicorn than
the “appropriate case.”100 This was not lost on Justice Brennan, whose dissent
focused on the reasonableness of allowing Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction.101
Brennan accused the majority’s analysis of “focus[ing] tightly on the
existence of contacts between the forum and the defendant”102 such that it
ignored the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the case and did not
adequately balance the extent of the inconveniences on the parties.103 He
criticized what he saw as International Shoe’s “defendant focus,” and
suggested that advances in transportation technology and the increasingly
national scope of business had made that focus obsolete.104 Oklahoma had a

97

See Pfeffer, supra note 72, at 77–84 (discussing the World-Wide case and opinion).
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. Although one could foresee that a car distributed and sold
by the defendants in New York might make its way to Oklahoma, it was not foreseeable that the defendants
could be haled into court in Oklahoma. Id. at 295–96. The Court reached this result to preserve “a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allow[ed] potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct [would] and [would] not render them liable to suit.” Id. at
297.
99
Id. These factors are: “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies,” and “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.” Id. (citations omitted).
100
See id. at 294 (emphasizing the importance of contacts by stating, “Even if the defendant would
suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if
the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; [and] even if the forum State is the
most convenient location for litigation.”).
101
See id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102
Id. Responding to the majority’s conclusion that the defendants lacked contacts with Oklahoma,
Brennan noted that, because they sold a highly mobile product, the defendants “derive[d] substantial benefits
from States other than [their] own,” and therefore did have contacts with Oklahoma. Id. at 307.
103
Brennan argued that the Court should give these factors as much weight as the extent and nature of
the defendant’s contacts. Id. at 299–300.
104
Id. at 308–09.
98
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strong interest in adjudicating this dispute,105 and the burdens on the
defendants were not excessive enough to trigger due process concerns.106
Despite Justice Brennan’s protest, the Court in World-Wide again made it
clear that it no longer believed that personal jurisdiction should be decided on
the basis of the overall fairness or reasonableness of jurisdiction. Rather, the
Court made it clear that its focal point for personal jurisdiction was now, and
would continue to be, the defendant’s contacts with the forum.
C. Specific Jurisdiction Today: Disorder “Arising out of or Relating to” a
Muddled Theory
Four years after World-Wide, the Court settled on a three-part test for
specific jurisdiction.107 First, the defendant must have purposefully availed
itself of the forum to an extent where it is foreseeable that it might be “haled
into court there.”108 Second, the plaintiff’s claims must “arise out of or relate
to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum.109 Third, the exercise of
jurisdiction must “comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’” when
considered in light of the factors mentioned by the Court in World-Wide.110
Much has been written criticizing the Court’s current approach,111 and
some commentators have gone so far as to suggest abandoning it, and even the
entire International Shoe framework, altogether.112 But what the California
105
Id. at 305 (“The State has a legitimate interest in enforcing its laws designed to keep its highway
system safe . . . .”).
106
See id. at 309.
107
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–78 (1985) (setting out the test).
108
Id. at 474 (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297). A typical justification offered for this prong is that
it allows potential defendants to structure their conduct to make litigation more predictable in certain
jurisdictions. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 885–86 (Cal. 2016) (quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–72), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
109
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
110
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). For
a list of the factors, see supra note 99.
111
See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 15, at 130–32 (criticizing the Court’s specific jurisdiction framework
as restrictive on tort claimants, discouraging of consolidating litigation, and indifferent to the “relative
economic strength of the parties”); see also Freer, supra note 39 (criticizing the Court’s test for being too
focused on the defendant’s contacts with the forum).
112
See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 83, at 24–25 (arguing that the Court should stop analyzing jurisdiction
as a constitutional issue and should leave regulation of jurisdiction to Congress or to state legislatures); Jay
Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1073 (1994)
(suggesting that the Court “stop supervising jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause”); Douglas D.
McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 754 (2003) (arguing that the
Court should abandon the minimum contacts test entirely); Pfeffer, supra note 72, at 162 (arguing that matters
of personal jurisdiction should be left to the states to decide).
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Supreme Court’s opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb focused on was the second
part of the test—the Court’s requirement that the plaintiff’s claims somehow
“arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum.
The primary criticism commentators have levied against the relatedness
requirement is that it is incomplete.113 The Court has yet to define its
contours.114 And because of the Court’s prolonged radio silence, lower courts
across the country developed conflicting tests for determining the relatedness
required to assert specific jurisdiction.115 The two most common tests sit at
opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of restrictiveness. On the permissive
end of the spectrum, a number of courts have adopted a but-for test, under
which the defendant’s actions inside the forum state are related to the
plaintiff’s claim if they are in “the chain of events leading up to the cause of
action.”116 In contrast, the “substantive relevance” test focuses on whether the
defendant’s contacts give rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action.117 If the
contacts establish one of the elements of the underlying claim, then the
relatedness requirement is met.118 The absence of a uniform test of relatedness
created confusion among courts.119 Although the Court recently addressed this
requirement in Bristol-Myers Squibb,120 confusion will likely continue.
Regardless of whether the relatedness requirement is clarified, when
considered alongside the purposeful availment requirement, it raises further
problems because the Court has used both to refocus personal jurisdiction
113
See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “arising out of” and
“relating to” are different standards, and that the majority opinion failed to distinguish between the two); see
also Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in
Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867 (2012); Lawrence W. Moore, S.J., The Relatedness
Problem in Specific Jurisdiction, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 583 (2001); Ryne H. Ballou, Note, Be More Specific:
Vague Precedents and the Differing Standards by Which to Apply “Arises out of or Relates to” in the Test for
Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 663 (2013).
114
Although the Court first used the “arise out of or relate to” language in Helicopteros, it decided that
case on general jurisdiction grounds because all parties conceded that specific jurisdiction was not available.
466 U.S. at 415–16. Justice Brennan disagreed. Id. at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By deciding the case as
a matter of general jurisdiction, Brennan argued, the Court missed an opportunity to clarify the distinction
between contacts that ‘“give rise’ to” and contacts that “are ‘related to’” a cause of action. Id. at 425. For more
on Justice Brennan’s dissent, see Freer, supra note 39, at 569.
115
See infra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
116
Ballou, supra note 113, at 668–69 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mark M. Maloney, Note,
Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the “Arise from or Relate To” Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1277 (1993)).
117
See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1444, 1455
(1988).
118
Id.
119
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
120
See infra Section II.C.
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analysis away from considerations of fairness and toward an approach focused
almost solely on whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum constitute
legal “contacts.”121 A useful illustration of how focusing on contacts muddies
the waters of personal jurisdiction is the Court’s handling of this issue in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.122
The facts of McIntyre present the quintessential stream of commerce
scenario.123 Nicastro injured his hand with a metal-shearing machine while
employed at a scrap metal company in New Jersey.124 J. McIntyre Machinery,
an English corporation, manufactured the machine in England and sold it in the
United States through a distributor.125 Although McIntyre representatives
attended annual trade shows across the United States to promote its machines,
none took place in New Jersey.126 At most, four of McIntyre’s machines made
their way into New Jersey.127 Nicastro filed suit in New Jersey; on appeal, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state could exercise jurisdiction over
McIntyre.128 Although the U.S. Supreme Court could not come to a consensus
as to its rationale,129 the Justices all agreed that the case turned on whether
McIntyre established any contacts whatsoever with New Jersey.130
Writing for a plurality, Justice Kennedy focused entirely on whether
McIntyre had established any contacts with New Jersey, even though (1) it
intended to sell its machines throughout the United States, and (2) at least one
121
See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (holding that Nevada lacked authority to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a federal agent who interacted with Nevada residents outside the forum because “our
‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s
contacts with persons who reside there.” (citation omitted)); see also Freer, supra note 39, at 584 (noting that
under the Court’s current approach, “[f]inding no contact [with the forum] is the only realistic way to defeat
jurisdiction”).
122
564 U.S. 873 (2011).
123
The stream of commerce will be familiar to anyone who has taken a first-year Civil Procedure course.
It arises when a manufacturer’s goods make their way from one forum to another through transactions to
which the manufacturer is not a party. See Alan G. Schwartz & Kevin M. Smith, Wading Through the Stream
of Commerce: When Can Foreign Manufacturers Expect to Be Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in United States
Courts?, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 349 (2013). Fitting stream of commerce cases into the purposeful availment
framework has vexed the Court for decades. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
124
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878.
125
Id. The distributor was based in Ohio. Id. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126
Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 877–78.
129
Kennedy announced the judgment in an opinion joined by Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas; Breyer and
Alito filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment; Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented. Id. at
877, 887, 893 (2014).
130
Id. at 880, 888 (plurality opinion), 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Freer, supra note 39.
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of its machines made its way into New Jersey.131 Kennedy focused his inquiry
on whether McIntyre’s conduct evidenced an intent to “target[] the forum.”132
This analysis hardly considered whether jurisdiction would be fair. In fact,
Kennedy made it clear that fairness plays second fiddle to contacts in the
Court’s analysis.133 Kennedy concluded that although McIntyre targeted the
entire U.S. market through the distributor, it had not specifically targeted New
Jersey, and, therefore, jurisdiction was inappropriate.134
Justice Ginsburg disagreed.135 She argued that because McIntyre sought to
distribute its machines throughout the United States, it had established contacts
with the country as a whole, and, therefore, with every state where its
machines were sold, including New Jersey.136 Although Ginsburg based her
opinion in part on the notion that jurisdiction would be fair in New Jersey,137
she still focused her analysis around the question of whether McIntyre had
established contacts with New Jersey.138 So although Ginsburg dissented, she
did so within the same framework as the other Justices, signaling that the
Court’s message on contacts, not fairness, was proper.
The unfortunate thing about McIntyre is that the Court would have engaged
in a much fuller analysis through the mélange approach. First, New Jersey had
a strong interest in adjudicating this case apart from the fact that the plaintiff
was injured there. New Jersey is home to more scrap metal processing than any
other state;139 surely it would want to ensure that machines used to process
scrap metal are safe. Second, the injury occurred in New Jersey, where
witnesses and relevant evidence would be located, making litigation more

131

McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878.
Id. at 882.
133
Id. at 883 (“[J]urisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness . . . .”).
134
Id. at 886–67.
135
Id. at 893 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136
Id. at 905. For more discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, see Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the
Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 504–08
(2012).
137
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s opinion
“would take a giant step away from the ‘notions of fair play and substantial justice’ underlying International
Shoe” (citation omitted)); see also Steinman, supra note 136, at 504–06 (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent combined an inquiry into contacts and reasonableness that was unlike the Court’s previous analyses).
138
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that Nicastro’s situation presents an
exception to the general rule that when a plaintiff is injured by a manufacturer’s product, “jurisdiction is
appropriately exercised by courts of the place where the product was sold and caused injury”).
139
See id. at 895 (citing ROB VAN HAAREN ET AL., THE STATE OF GARBAGE IN AMERICA tbl.3, BIOCYCLE
(2010)).
132
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efficient.140 Third, McIntyre derived a significant amount of revenue from the
sale of its machines in New Jersey, suggesting that McIntyre’s contact with
New Jersey was more substantial than the Court credited.141 Finally, when the
conveniences of the parties are weighed, the balance tipped in favor of
litigating in New Jersey. Nicastro was an individual plaintiff who lost several
fingers in an industrial accident,142 making travel for litigation a difficult task.
In contrast, McIntyre representatives travel across the Atlantic each year to
attend trade shows,143 indicating that travel was less of a burden on the
defendant.
Unfortunately, because the Court has adopted an approach to personal
jurisdiction that is focused primarily on the nature of the defendant’s contacts
rather than asserting whether jurisdiction is fair, the Court’s analysis could not
be so thorough. Five years after McIntyre, the California Supreme Court issued
a reminder that current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is flawed.
II. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT: MAKING SENSE
OF THE OPINIONS
Bristol-Myers Squibb presented an interesting fact pattern.144 To
summarize, a group of California residents and nonresidents filed suit against
BMS alleging injuries caused by one of the company’s drugs.145 However, the
nonresident plaintiffs suffered their alleged injuries outside California, BMS
developed and manufactured the drugs that allegedly injured the nonresident
plaintiffs outside California, and BMS coordinated advertising for the drugs
outside California.146 One would be forgiven for thinking at first glance that
this is a simple case of attempted forum shopping.147 However, forum

140
See Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) (discussing the availability of
witnesses and evidence as a relevant factor in balancing personal jurisdiction factors).
141
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The machine that injured Nicastro . . . sold
in the United States for $24,900 in 1995 . . . .”). The Court has also upheld jurisdiction in tort cases in which
the defendant has made a single contact with the state. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 100–01 (3d
ed. 2012).
142
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143
See id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
144
See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
145
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773
(2017).
146
Id. at 878–90.
147
“Forum shopping ‘occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or
jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.’” Kimberly Jade Norwood,
Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 268 (1996) (quoting
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shopping is typically framed as a question of venue,148 and BMS moved to
dismiss the nonresidents’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.149
Regardless, the California Supreme Court held that California could exercise
specific jurisdiction over BMS regarding the nonresident plaintiffs.150 While
this result was by itself acceptable, the reasoning the court used to arrive at it
was not.151 And, when the Supreme Court intervened, it doubled down on its
contacts-focused approach.152
A. The California Supreme Court’s Opinion
Moving to the question of jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court first
concluded that California could not exercise general jurisdiction over BMS.153
The court took just three paragraphs to reject the plaintiffs’ arguments that
California could exercise general jurisdiction.154 With the question of general
jurisdiction settled, the court moved on to determine whether California could
exercise specific jurisdiction.155 Unfortunately, answering this question would
not be so simple.
The court’s treatment of specific jurisdiction began in an unassuming
manner: Did BMS purposefully avail itself of California law by conducting
business there?156 The answer to this question was obviously yes; there was
“no question that BMS [had] purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in California.”157 The company marketed and sold nearly
$1 billion worth of Plavix in California, maintained research facilities in
California, and “contracted with a California-based” distributor, to name a just
a few of its contacts with the state.158

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990)). Forum shopping is typically framed as a question of venue
rather than one of personal jurisdiction.
148
See Mary Garvey Alegro, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78
NEB. L. REV. 79, 79–80 (1999) (describing forum shopping as “the act of seeking the most advantageous venue
in which to try a case.”).
149
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 878.
150
Id.
151
See infra Section II.B.2.
152
See infra Section II.C.
153
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 883–84.
154
Id. at 884. The plaintiffs made two arguments: (1) BMS registered to do business in California and
had an agent for service of process there and (2) BMS contracted with McKesson, which has its principal place
of business in California, to distribute Plavix. Id. The court rejected both. Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 885.
157
Id. at 886.
158
Id. at 874, 876; see also Redwood City, California, BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB, http://www.bms.
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While it was clear that BMS purposefully availed itself of California law,
what was not clear was how the nonresident plaintiffs’ injuries arose out of or
related to these contacts. By finding that the injuries were related to BMS’s
contacts,159 the California Supreme Court took its most audacious step of the
opinion. To understand the court’s decision, it is important to first understand
the relatedness test that it applied.
1. A “Sliding-Scale” Test for Relatedness
The California Supreme Court applied what it called a “substantial
connection” test for relatedness in Bristol-Myers Squibb.160 Under this test, a
claim arises out of, or relates to, a defendant’s contacts if “there is a substantial
nexus or connection between the defendant’s forum activities and the
plaintiff’s claim.”161 Courts applying this test consider both “the nature of the
defendant’s activities in the forum and the relationship of the claim to those
activities . . . .”162 The next question for the court was where to draw the line
separating substantial from insubstantial connections. In a case in which
nonresident plaintiffs alleged injuries from a nonresident defendant’s out-ofstate activities, this question became contentious.163
The court took a fluid view of the connection requirement. When
determining whether contacts are substantially related to a claim, it noted, “the
intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim to those contacts
are inversely related.”164 Put another way, when a defendant’s contacts with
the state are great, the connection between those contacts and a claim may be

com/sustainability/worldwide_facilities/north_america/Pages/redwood_city_california.aspx (last visited Nov.
5, 2016).
159
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 887–91. The court’s analysis was not entirely unprecedented; it
mirrors the approach taken by the California Court of Appeal below. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016); see also Linda Silberman,
The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United
States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 685–87 (2015) (describing and criticizing the approach taken by the
Court of Appeal).
160
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 885.
161
Id. (quoting Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 1054, 1068 (2005)).
162
Id.
163
The majority and the dissent in Bristol-Myers Squibb split over this question. While the majority
found a substantial connection, the dissenters argued that the California plaintiffs’ claims were merely
“parallel” to the nonresident plaintiffs’. See id. at 888 (discussing the difference in opinion between the
majority and dissent).
164
Id. at 885 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc., 112 P.3d
28, 37 (Cal. 2005)).
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more attenuated, and vice versa.165 Courts and commentators refer to this
approach as a “sliding-scale” test for relatedness.166 After explaining its test,
the court proceeded to apply it in two steps: first, it assessed the extent of
BMS’s contacts with California; and, second, it looked for a connection
between those contacts and the nonresidents’ injuries.167
Unsurprisingly, the court found that BMS had extensive contacts with
California. The company marketed, advertised, and sold Plavix in the state.168
It contracted with a California-based distributor to distribute Plavix in the
state.169 It employed sales representatives in the state.170 It operated research
facilities in the state and even maintained an office in Sacramento to lobby the
state on its behalf.171 All told, BMS employed over 400 people in California,
and over the course of six years, it sold roughly $1 billion worth of Plavix in
the state.172 It is no wonder the court concluded that “there [was] no question
that BMS [had] purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
in California, invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.”173
While finding extensive contacts between BMS and California was easy,
connecting those contacts to the nonresident plaintiffs would require a greater
logical leap. As discussed above, the nonresidents’ injuries arose from Plavix
that was not manufactured in, purchased from, or distributed through
California.174 Regardless, the “sliding scale” made this leap possible. Because
the court found that BMS’s contacts with California were extensive, minimum
contacts for specific jurisdiction could be found “based on a less direct
connection between BMS’s forum activities and [the nonresident] plaintiffs’
165
Id. at 887 (quoting Vons Cos., Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1096 (Cal. 1996) (“A claim
need not arise directly from the defendant’s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the contact to
warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.” (internal quotations omitted)). The California Supreme Court
referred to the test as a “‘substantial connection’ test.” Id. at 885.
166
See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1775–76 (2017) (“The
California Supreme Court’s ‘sliding scale approach’ . . . .”); Ballou, supra note 113, at 676–78 (describing the
California test); see also William M. Richman, Part I—Casad’s Jurisdiction in Civil Actions; Part II—A
Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
1328, 1345–46 (1984) (discussing the academic origins of the test).
167
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 887–90. By adopting this test, the California Supreme Court again
expressly rejected the “substantive relevance” test for relatedness, as it did in Vons. See id. at 888–89 (citing
Vons, 926 P.2d at 1112).
168
Id. at 886.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
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claims than might otherwise be required.”175 No one doubted that California
could exercise specific jurisdiction over the California plaintiffs’ claims—they
arose in California.176 All the court needed to do was find a substantial
connection between the claims of the residents and nonresidents. Two facts
guided the court’s decision; both turned on similarities between the California
plaintiffs and nonresident plaintiffs.
First, the court found a substantial connection based on the fact that the
California and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were, for all purposes,
identical.177 Each plaintiff alleged the same thirteen causes of action178 based
on BMS’s allegedly defective product and the allegedly misleading marketing
and promotion campaigns used to sell it.179 Thus one aspect of the “substantial
connection” between BMS’s contacts with California and the nonresident
plaintiffs’ claims was the fact that a group of California plaintiffs also filed
suit.180
Second, the court found a substantial connection between BMS’s
California contacts and the nonresidents’ injuries because the company
developed, manufactured, distributed, and advertised Plavix across the United
States.181 To borrow the court’s language, BMS developed and sold Plavix as
part of a “single, coordinated, nationwide course of conduct directed out of
BMS’s New York headquarters and New Jersey operations center and
implemented by distributors and salespersons across the country.”182 Therefore
the California and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were not based on BMS’s
similar activities both inside and outside the state.183 Rather than being isolated
incidents in different states, BMS’s activities that injured the California
plaintiffs and the activities that injured the nonresident plaintiffs were one and
the same.184

175

Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 889.
Id. at 888 (“The California plaintiffs’ claims . . . certainly arise from BMS’s purposeful contacts with
this state . . . .”).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 877.
179
Id. at 888.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 888–89.
182
Id. at 888 (citing Cornelison v. Chaney, 545 P.2d 264, 269 (Cal. 1976)) (noting that the interstate
nature of a defendant’s business typically weighs in favor of finding specific jurisdiction in California).
183
Id.
184
See id. at 889. Three judges dissented, arguing instead that BMS’s California and out-of-state
activities were merely “parallel,” meaning similar, rather than substantially connected. See id. at 899
(Werdegar, J., dissenting) (citing Silberman, supra note 159, at 687).
176
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2. The Fundamental Fairness of Litigating in California
Having concluded that the volume of BMS’s contacts with California,
along with the connections between those contacts and its out-of-state
activities, constituted a sufficient nexus to satisfy the second prong of the
Supreme Court’s specific jurisdiction test, the court moved to the third prong:
reasonableness.185 Because it is easier to find jurisdiction reasonable than it is
to find minimum contacts,186 the court made relatively quick work of this
analysis.187 The court addressed four factors: the burden on BMS imposed by
litigating in California, California’s interest in providing a forum, the
plaintiffs’ interest in litigating in the forum, and judicial economy.188
First, the court concluded that litigating the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims
in California would not place an undue burden on BMS because the
alternative—rejecting jurisdiction in California—posed a greater burden.189 If
the court denied jurisdiction in California, the practical result would be BMS
defending the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims “in a scattershot manner . . . in
potentially up to 34 different states.”190 The court recognized that litigating in
California would not be cheap; most of the company’s information relevant to
discovery was located in its principal places of business in New York and New
Jersey.191 Still, litigating the claims together in California would not
overburden BMS.192
Second, the court made three arguments to demonstrate that California also
had an interest in providing a forum for the nonresident plaintiffs. First,
evidence of the nonresidents’ injuries would be helpful at trial in proving
defects in Plavix, because under California law, “evidence of other injuries is
‘admissible to prove a defective condition.’”193 Second, the court noted that
California expressed its interest in regulating the behavior of pharmaceutical
manufacturers through a “substantial body of California law aimed at
protecting consumers from the potential dangers posed by prescription

185

Id. at 891 (majority opinion).
See Freer, supra note 39, at 572–73 (discussing the “strikingly onerous burden” on defendants to
prove that the jurisdiction is unreasonable in a particular forum).
187
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 891–94.
188
See id.
189
Id. at 891–92.
190
Id. at 891.
191
Id. at 892. The court mitigated these concerns by noting that California law allows for discovery to
take place out of the state. Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. (quoting Ault v. Int’l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Cal. 1974)).
186
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medication.”194 And finally, California had an additional interest in regulating
McKesson Corporation, BMS’s codefendant that is headquartered in
California.195
Third, the court found that jurisdiction in California was reasonable when
considering the plaintiffs’ interest in litigating in a convenient forum.196 This
determination is not surprising. If the plaintiffs felt that California was not a
convenient forum, they would not have filed suit there, a conclusion made
clearer by the fact that only eighty-six of the plaintiffs reside in the state.197
Finally, the court concluded that allowing the plaintiffs’ case to move
forward as a single mass tort action in California presented an efficient means
to resolve the dispute in light of the “shared interests of the interstate judicial
system.”198 The court based its reasoning on protecting the interests of both the
defendant and the plaintiffs.199 Splitting the litigation across several forums
would risk “the possible unfairness of punishing a defendant over and over
again for the same tortious conduct.”200 Splitting the litigation would also
encourage a “race to the courthouse,” presenting the possibility that some
claims might be shut out by others.201
After considering these factors in turn, the court concluded that exercising
jurisdiction over BMS in California was not unreasonable.202 Thus, California
could exercise specific jurisdiction over BMS without violating due process.203
B. Analysis: Reasonable Result, Unreasonable Opinion
The California Supreme Court’s opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb is a prime
example of a reasonable result reached by unreasonable means. As previously
mentioned, the Court’s recent moves to limit general jurisdiction led plaintiffs
to push for expanding the scope of specific jurisdiction.204 In Bristol-Myers
194

Id. at 892.
Id. at 893.
196
Id.
197
See id. The court also noted that the San Francisco Superior Court’s complex litigation department is
adept at handling similarly sized cases. Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 893–94.
200
Id. at 893 (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 2000)).
201
Id. (quoting Exxon, 229 F.3d at 795–96). The court also noted that if litigation were split up,
discovery disputes in other forums would cause delays in California, directly affecting the California plaintiffs.
Id. at 894.
202
Id. at 894.
203
Id.
204
See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
195
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Squibb, the California Supreme Court did just that, finding specific jurisdiction
when the facts suggested that it was not unfair to compel BMS to litigate these
claims in California.205 However, the “substantial connection” test for
relatedness did not comport with the Supreme Court’s recent treatment of
personal jurisdiction, and when the Court stepped in, it moved to limit specific
jurisdiction.206
1. A Reasonable Result
Three arguments support the fairness of allowing California to exercise
personal jurisdiction over BMS. First, the California Supreme Court’s decision
moves a dispute that has been lingering for years closer to a final resolution on
the merits. Second, BMS is in a better position to litigate all claims in
California than are the nonresident plaintiffs to litigate elsewhere. Finally,
allowing the claims to move forward together rather than splitting them up
mitigates the dangers of inconsistent outcomes and promotes a more efficient
resolution of the dispute.
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb moved
the underlying disputes over Plavix closer to being resolved. The plaintiffs
filed their complaints in March of 2012.207 The parties then spent over four
years disputing personal jurisdiction.208 What they did not do during this time
was argue the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.209 Resolving the question of
jurisdiction in the plaintiffs’ favor, rather than forcing the nonresident plaintiffs
to file their claims elsewhere, removes at least one obstacle in the path to
settling the dispute.210
Asking which party is better equipped to litigate in another forum also
points toward the fairness of finding jurisdiction proper in California. Put
simply, California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair because BMS can
afford to litigate in California.211 BMS is undeniably large; in 2015 alone it
205

See supra Section II.A.
See infra notes 237–42 and accompanying text.
207
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 877–78.
208
See id. at 878–79 (detailing the procedural background).
209
Cf. id.
210
Extensive litigation focusing on issues raised at the pleading stage is nothing new. See Subrin &
Main, supra note 22, at 1877–79 (describing a modern trend toward greater disposition of cases at the pleading
stage). For example, in 1962, 89% of civil cases were resolved before trial by dismissal, summary judgment,
or settlement; today that number is over 99%. Id. at 1878.
211
The Court used to consider the relative wealth of the parties when analyzing personal jurisdiction.
See Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1950) (comparing the parties’ relative wealth).
The Court has not considered it since 1984. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483 n.25
206
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reported total revenues of $16.56 billion and total income before taxes of $2.07
billion.212 In contrast, the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers Squibb are individuals
alleging that Plavix caused, inter alia, bleeding, heart attacks, and even
death.213 This description does not paint a portrait of a group that would be
able to maintain suits against BMS individually or in smaller groups in
separate forums.214 The comparative positions of the parties in Bristol-Myers
Squibb should tilt toward accepting the plaintiffs’ chosen forum.
Allowing the claims to move forward together, rather than forcing the
nonresident plaintiffs to file suit elsewhere, also promotes an efficient
resolution to the dispute. As the California Supreme Court noted, the
alternative to allowing all the claims to move forward together was to dismiss
the nonresidents’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, leaving them little
choice but to file elsewhere.215 Two dangers are apparent in this outcome.
First, spreading this litigation over several forums risks discovery delays, as
disputes in one forum spill over into others.216 And second, splitting these
similar claims over multiple forums also raises the possibility of inconsistent
outcomes.217 If the litigation were to be split, plaintiffs who sue in State A may
get a more favorable outcome than plaintiffs who sue in State B; likewise,
BMS may find itself with greater liability to the State A plaintiffs than to the
State B plaintiffs. By allowing all the plaintiffs to sue together, the California
Supreme Court mitigated these concerns. However, although the California
Supreme Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over BMS reached a fair
result, the reasoning it used to arrive at that decision was far from ideal.
2. An Unreasonable Opinion
Two problems emerge in the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Bristol-Myers Squibb. The first is the court’s willingness to emphasize contacts

(1985) (“Absent compelling considerations, . . . a defendant . . . may not defeat jurisdiction . . . simply because
of his adversary’s greater net wealth.”); see also Borchers, supra note 15, at 131–32 (referring to the failure to
consider the parties’ relative wealth as problematic).
212
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K/30) (Feb. 12, 2016).
213
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 878.
214
Cf. Travelers, 339 U.S. at 648–49 (discussing the burdens on plaintiffs presented by litigating in
alternative forums).
215
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 894.
216
Id.
217
See Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Plagued by Concerns over Federalism, Jurisdiction,
and Fairness, 37 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2004); see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex
Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 566–67 (1996) (noting that many commenters regard inconsistent outcomes
as damaging to the public image of the legal system).
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while downplaying fairness.218 The bulk of the opinion’s treatment of specific
jurisdiction focuses on BMS’s contacts with California, while the
reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction over BMS is only briefly
addressed.219 That the court primarily focused on BMS’s contacts with
California is understandable; this is the approach that the Supreme Court has
followed in recent years.220 However, while the Court has moved to emphasize
contacts, it has never expressly abandoned the language from International
Shoe compelling consideration of “fair play and substantial justice.”221 Also,
Justice Brennan’s qualification from Burger King—that a lesser showing of
contacts may be alleviated by a showing of fundamental fairness—remains the
law.222 Bristol-Myers Squibb was an opportunity for the California Supreme
Court to place more emphasis on fairness. Instead, it focused on BMS’s
contacts.223 The second, and more significant, problem with the opinion is that
its logic does not hold water.
Three issues plague the California Supreme Court’s reasoning. The first
lies in the court’s reliance on the similarity between the residents’ and
nonresidents’ claims. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected arguments based
on similarity in the past.224 In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Court vacated the D.C.
Circuit’s application of claim preclusion to two separate plaintiffs.225 The D.C.
Circuit relied primarily on the fact that the plaintiffs were “close associate[s]”
who sought the same remedy from the same defendant.226 Regardless, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding in part that the similarity between the two
claims did not establish a privity relationship between them.227 While
jurisdiction is a different issue than privity, what the California Supreme Court
did in Bristol-Myers Squibb can be likened to what the D.C. Circuit did in

218
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 887–91 (examining whether the nonresidents’ claims “arise
out of or relate to” BMS’s California contacts); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the
contacts-oriented nature of modern personal jurisdiction analysis).
219
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 891–94.
220
See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121, 1125 n.9 (2014) (examining fairness in connection
with the defendant’s contacts with the forum rather than fairness for the plaintiffs); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (concluding that jurisdiction is a question of “authority rather than
fairness”).
221
See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (citation omitted); McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 880 (citation omitted).
222
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
223
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
224
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873; Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
225
Taylor, 553 U.S. at 885.
226
Id. at 889–91 (alteration in original).
227
Id. at 904–07. Under the law of preclusion, a nonparty to a case may be bound by the judgment of
that case in future litigation if he is found to be in privity with a party in that case. See FREER, supra note 141,
at 608–12 (discussing privity).
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Taylor. Like the D.C. Circuit, which found privity between two similar claims,
the California Supreme Court held that it could exercise personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident claims in part because they were similar—identical, in
fact—to the resident claims.228 And like the D.C. Circuit, the California
Supreme Court was reversed.229
The second issue with the Bristol-Myers Squibb opinion is found in the
California Supreme Court’s reliance on the fact that BMS sold Plavix in
California as part of a nationwide course of conduct. In McIntyre, a majority of
the Justices rejected the idea that a defendant’s contacts with the United States
as a whole are relevant in assessing personal jurisdiction for a state.230
Notwithstanding this precedent, the California Supreme Court explicitly based
its decision on BMS’s nationwide contacts: the fact that all the plaintiffs were
injured by a drug BMS distributed throughout the United States created a
substantial connection between BMS’s California contacts and the
nonresidents’ claims.231
The third—and most significant—issue with the California Supreme
Court’s opinion was the “substantial connection” test itself. Under that test, the
extent of a defendant’s contacts and the degree of relatedness required to
justify jurisdiction are “inversely related.”232 Therefore a tenuous connection
between a claim and a defendant’s contacts with a forum is acceptable where
those contacts are more extensive.233 Permitting extensive contacts to act as a
substitute for relatedness recalls the “continuous and systematic” standard the
Court applied to general jurisdiction analysis before 2011, and “blurs the
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction.”234 The Court abandoned
228

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 888 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773

(2017).
229

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017).
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 886 (noting that although McIntyre targeted the entire United States, its
“purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the United States . . . alone are relevant”); id. at 891 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (arguing that considering a defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole contradicts
the traditional inquiry into the defendant’s contacts with the forum state).
231
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 888.
232
Ballou, supra note 113, at 676–78 (referring to the test as the “sliding-scale” test and discussing the
inverse relationship between contacts and relatedness); see Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 885.
233
Ballou, supra note 113, at 677.
234
Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d. 569, 583 (Tex. 2007) (“[D]eciding jurisdiction
based on a sliding continuum blurs the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction that our judicial
system has firmly embraced . . . .”); see Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 19, at 234–35 (criticizing the test as
lacking predictive value); Silberman, supra note 159, at 686–87 (arguing that the California approach to
relatedness “appears to reintroduce general jurisdiction by another name”). But see Moore, supra note 113, at
595 (citing Vons Cos., Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1093 (Cal. 1996)) (arguing that the
California Supreme Court’s relatedness test does not distort the line between general and specific jurisdiction).
230
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this standard in Goodyear and Daimler; there was little reason to think that it
would endorse adapting that approach to specific jurisdiction.235
C. Supreme Court Intervention: More of the Same
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the California
Supreme Court’s decision, the Court signaled that it planned to shed some light
on relatedness.236 The Court’s opinion, however, suggests implications beyond
that. Three things are notable about the Supreme Court’s opinion in BristolMyers Squibb. First, the Court adopted what appears to be a restrictive
definition of relatedness, one that undoubtedly continues the contacts-focused
trend. Second, the Court justified its approach on federalism grounds,
expressly excluding other sources of fairness. And third, eight Justices signed
the majority opinion, suggesting that the Court’s new approach is here to stay.
Although the Court took steps to clarify the relatedness requirement in
Bristol-Myers Squibb, it adopted an approach that will ensure the personal
jurisdiction analysis remains effectively a contacts—rather than contacts and
fairness—analysis. The Court explicitly rejected California’s “sliding scale”
approach; it resembled too much of a hybrid between general and specific
jurisdiction.237 As Professor Freer notes, the Court made it clear that “[t]here is
no sliding scale. All cases are either specific or general.”238 And specific
jurisdiction requires a narrow form of relatedness: “an ‘affiliation between the
forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an
occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’”239 Under this “activity or
occurrence” view, the controversy, not the defendant, creates jurisdiction.240
This approach represents a step back from the Court’s reasoning in Walden, in
which the Court recognized that jurisdiction depends on “the relationship

235
The Supreme Court made the same argument. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct.
1773, 1781 (2017) (“Our cases provide no support for [the substantial connection] approach, which resembles
a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”). For more about the impact of the Goodyear and Daimler
decisions on general jurisdiction, see supra notes 13–17.
236
See Brief for Petitioner at i, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466) (framing the
question to be addressed by the Court as one of relatedness).
237
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
238
Richard D. Freer, Analysis: BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court,
EMORY L. NEWS CTR. (July 19, 2017), http://law.emory.edu/news-center/releases/2017/07/Freer-BNSFRailway-Co-v-Tyrrell-Bristol-Myers-Squibb-v-Superior-Court%20.html#.Wa9iTdOGOfV.
239
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). This language evokes the substantive relevance test for
relatedness proposed by commenters. See Brilmayer, supra note 117.
240
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
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among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”241 That three-part
formulation suggested that a defendant’s non-controversy-related contact with
a forum could factor in the analysis.242 But by limiting the scope of contacts
relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis, the Court made it clear that it
intends jurisdiction to remain a matter of almost exclusively contacts. And as
the analysis continues to center on contacts, it will continue to overlook
fairness.
While the “activity or occurrence” language of the Court’s updated
relatedness standard by itself suggests a contacts-focused approach to personal
jurisdiction, the Court’s return to territorial federalism as the justification for
limiting personal jurisdiction makes it clear that fairness continues to play little
more than a supporting role. Revisiting a debate that it began in 1982,243 the
Court justified its restrictive vision of personal jurisdiction on a territorial view
of state sovereignty. Limits on jurisdiction act not just to shield defendants
from bothersome litigation, they also act as “territorial limitations on the power
of the respective states.”244 Federalism, the Court noted, could be decisive, as a
state’s sovereignty “implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister
States.”245 But framing personal jurisdiction primarily as a matter of territorial
limits obscures other fairness factors, namely “the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief” and “the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.”246 Surely
these interests must trump territorial limits in some circumstances and justify
subjecting a defendant to suit in a “distant” forum. However, the Court’s
opinion—and its focus on borders—suggests the opposite.
The broad agreement of the Justices also suggests that the Court plans to
hold fast to its contacts-focused approach. Unlike McIntyre, which was a 4–2–
3 decision,247 the Justices ruled 8–1 in Bristol-Myers Squibb.248 Justice
Sotomayor was the lone dissenter, arguing that the majority opinion did little
more than limit the scope of personal jurisdiction. Limits on jurisdiction should

241
See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)).
242
See id.
243
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (arguing that
limits on personal jurisdiction are not matters of state sovereignty).
244
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
245
Id. at 1780 (alteration in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293
(1980)).
246
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; see also supra note 99 (listing other fairness factors).
247
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
248
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. 1773.
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not be defined by federalism or territorial limitations, she argued. When a
plaintiff’s claim arises from a defendant’s nationwide course of conduct,
“[w]hat interest could any single State have in adjudicating [the] claims that
the other States do not share?”249 Instead, limits on personal jurisdiction should
be measured “by the yardstick set out in International Shoe—‘fair play and
substantial justice.’”250 And by that standard, Justice Sotomayor argued, “there
is nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corporation to suit in a State for a
nationwide course of conduct that injures both forum residents and
nonresidents alike.”251 That Justice Sotomayor dissented alone suggests the
majority’s aversion to considering fairness.
So how can the Court expand specific jurisdiction after restricting it in
Bristol-Myers Squibb? Justice Sotomayor was correct. To ensure that specific
jurisdiction “flourishes,”252 the Court must return to International Shoe’s
yardstick and revisit the mélange.
III. RETURNING TO THE MÉLANGE: STEPPING BACK TO MOVE FORWARD
Roughly sixty years have passed since the Court last applied the mélange
approach to decide a personal jurisdiction case.253 Why—when so much else
has changed in the intervening decades—should the Court go back? Two
reasons support this move. First, as we have already seen, the Court’s current
approach to personal jurisdiction, particularly specific jurisdiction, is flawed.254
And second, returning to the mélange approach offers a path forward that both
expands the scope of personal jurisdiction and promotes the normative values
mentioned at the beginning of this Comment: furthering fairness as a matter of
due process, respecting state sovereignty, and ensuring access to the courts.255
A. The Mélange: A Reasonable Way to Expand Personal Jurisdiction
If, as demonstrated by Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court is unwilling to
expand specific jurisdiction in response to a narrow general jurisdiction, then it
must reconsider its current approach, which has proven over the years to be

249
250
251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Id. at 1784.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 n.10 (2014).
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
See supra Section I.C.
See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
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inflexible.256 The most obvious effect of the Court’s current approach is the
possibility that a plaintiff will not be able to sue in the state where he or she
was injured.257 Professor Effron argues that confusion in personal jurisdiction
analysis arises because the Court continues to focus on analyzing the
relationship between the defendant and the forum, when it should be looking at
the relationship between the lawsuit and the forum as well.258 Although the
Court has given lip service to this relationship in recent decisions, it continues
to analyze specific jurisdiction in a restrictive, contacts-focused manner.259 To
break free from this restrictiveness, the Court should revisit its past.
A return to a mélange approach to personal jurisdiction would bring with it
benefits beyond simply moving away from a framework in which contacts are
front and center. Returning to the mélange would allow expanding the scope of
personal jurisdiction in a way that streamlines litigation and resolves disputes
on their merits, promotes access to the courts, respects state sovereignty, and
furthers the fundamental goals of due process fairness.
1. Streamlining Litigation and Resolving Disputes on Their Merits
Returning fairness to a position alongside—instead of behind—contacts in
the jurisdiction analysis would make jurisdiction harder for defendants to
contest.260 One of the most frequently cited benefits of the current approach is
that it promotes predictability for defendants to be able to know where they
may be sued.261 However, this predictability has also led to court dockets
becoming filled with procedural challenges to personal jurisdiction and other
motions to dismiss.262 One of the more prominent litigation trends of the past
256
See Borchers, supra note 15, at 130–32, 138 (criticizing the Court’s specific jurisdiction test and
concluding that it is overly restrictive); see also Genetin, supra note 13, at 110 (echoing similar concerns).
257
See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that a family injured in
Oklahoma may not sue there); see also Borchers, supra note 15, at 130 (noting that the Supreme Court’s
approach often denies plaintiff’s access to the forum in the state of injury).
258
Effron, supra note 113, at 891–92.
259
See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (noting that specific jurisdiction depends on
“the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984))); see also Genetin, supra note 13, at 157
(concluding that the specific jurisdiction analysis remains vague despite the discussion of the relation between
the lawsuit and the forum in Walden).
260
Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (finding jurisdiction based on a single contact).
261
See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach
to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 137 (2005) (remarking that the Court’s minimum contacts
approach provides a degree of predictability, which “insures . . . that nonresidents will be able to structure their
transactions to avoid the sovereign jurisdictional prerogative of a foreign state”).
262
Cf. Subrin & Main, supra note 22, at 1878–79 (discussing the increase in early dismissals).
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several decades has been the move toward greater reliance on early dismissal
of cases.263 Professor Miller refers to the procedural methods for early
dismissal as “stop signs.”264 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure codify seven
such stop signs to be raised at the pleading stage.265 The parties in BristolMyers Squibb spent four years arguing over jurisdiction alone.266 Arguing over
dismissal at such an early stage in litigation consumes resources and prevents
disputes from being decided on their merits.267 Returning to the mélange may
make a challenge to a court’s personal jurisdiction more difficult to both argue
and prevail under,268 thus acting as an incentive against making such a motion.
A court applying the mélange will consider each factor relevant to personal
jurisdiction—and will have discretion as to how to weigh each factor—in a
given case.269 This will remove some of the predictability in the jurisdictional
analysis.270 This may also raise the cost of contesting jurisdiction, as each
factor, rather than contacts alone, will need to be argued.271 Without
predictability and facing higher costs of making personal jurisdiction
arguments, defendants may find themselves discouraged from contesting
jurisdiction. Of course, making it harder for a defendant to prevail at contesting
jurisdiction would not remove every roadblock in the litigation process; parties
could still delay resolving disputes on their merits.272 Returning to the mélange
would be a small step, but one that would allow courts to abandon an analytical
process that Bristol-Myers Squibb and other cases have demonstrated is both
convoluted and resource-consuming.273 By simplifying the jurisdictional
263
Id. Professor Miller went so far as to refer to dismissal motions as “procedural playthings for
defendants.” Miller, supra note 23, at 476.
264
Miller, supra note 23, at 470.
265
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(7).
266
The complaints were originally filed in March 2012, and the California Supreme Court issued its
opinion in August 2016. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 877–79 (Cal. 2016), rev’d,
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
267
As Professor Miller put it, “More motions, more delays, more costs, more appeals, and potentially
more early dismissals.” Miller, supra note 23, at 476.
268
Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (upholding jurisdiction despite the defendant
having only one contact with California).
269
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
270
Cf. Rhodes, supra note 261, at 137 (discussing predictability under the Court’s current approach).
271
Compare McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (analyzing the mélange factors), with J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (focusing on the defendant’s contacts with the forum).
272
See Miller, supra note 23, at 470–73 (describing other procedural roadblocks, such as summary
judgment, class certification requirements, and heightened pleading standards). See generally Subrin & Main,
supra note 22 (describing procedural roadblocks in modern litigation).
273
To get a sense of the differences between the mélange approach and the Court’s current approach,
compare McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (finding jurisdiction based on a single contact in
part because the plaintiff was in a worse condition to travel), with McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 886 (denying
jurisdiction even though the plaintiff was in a worse condition to travel).
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analysis, moving back to the mélange may help alleviate the burdens of
modern judicial caseloads.
A return to the mélange approach would also improve access to the judicial
system and help to address what commenters refer to as the “right-remedy
gap.”274 Commenters trace the origins of this gap back to Marbury v. Madison
and the promise that “for every violation of a right, there must be a remedy.”275
Right-remedy commentary typically focuses on situations in which remedies
are not available for individuals who suffer constitutional injuries.276 But the
central concept, that injuries must have remedies, can be applied to civil
procedure—and personal jurisdiction—more broadly.277 As mentioned above,
the trend in modern litigation has been toward disposing cases before trial.278
While early dismissal may alleviate the burdens of a judge’s caseload,279 this
benefit cannot be viewed in isolation. In particular, dismissing cases before
discovery denies plaintiffs both the opportunity to develop a factual record that
could aid in reaching accurate settlements, and the opportunity to have their
cases resolved on the merits.280 One consequence of a return to the mélange
approach would be to broaden the scope of permissible personal jurisdiction.281
Under this approach, fewer cases might end up dismissed at the pleading
stage,282 thus improving the odds that they are decided on their merits rather
than on a procedural technicality.
Although expanding the scope of state personal jurisdiction will also
increase the number of venues for plaintiffs to sue in,283 returning to the
mélange does not pose a significant risk of encouraging forum shopping.
274

See generally Jeffries, supra note 25 (discussing the “right-remedy gap” and its origins).
Id. at 87 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
276
See generally id.; Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Paul
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (discussing the gap between injuries of
constitutional rights and available remedies).
277
For example, one of the goals of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to ensure
“the resolution of disputes on their merits.” Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?
What’s Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 587–88 (2011).
278
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
279
See Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J.
1491, 1496–98 (2016) (discussing the origins and effects of growing caseloads on federal judges).
280
See Miller, supra note 23, at 476−77; Subrin & Main, supra note 22, at 1878–79.
281
See Genetin, supra note 13, at 111 (arguing that a reasonableness-focused personal jurisdiction
framework would expand specific jurisdiction).
282
Cf. Subrin & Main, supra note 22, at 1878–79 (discussing the increase in early dismissals).
283
This is true in the context of federal litigation, where venue may be laid in “a judicial district in
which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2012). An entity such as a corporation is deemed to reside in each district where it is
subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to a given civil action. § 1391(c)(2).
275
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Critics of expanding the scope of personal jurisdiction worry that expansion
will work to defendants’ disadvantage, as plaintiffs will seek to file suit in the
jurisdiction with the most plaintiff-friendly law.284 Although forum shopping
presents real problems for the judicial system,285 these concerns will not be
eliminated by restricting personal jurisdiction. Regardless of the scope of
available jurisdiction, plaintiffs will seek to sue where they stand the greatest
chance of prevailing or securing a favorable settlement.286 Expanding
jurisdiction is not by itself a blank check to forum shop; a defendant in federal
court may still move to have the case transferred or dismissed for forum non
conveniens.287
2. Respecting State Sovereignty
Returning to a mélange approach would encourage courts to consider the
interests of the states as separate sovereigns in a way that the Court’s current
approach does not. Whether the personal jurisdiction analysis should be based
on considerations of state sovereignty at all has been the subject of much
debate.288 The prospect of resolving this debate is not aided by the fact that the
Court has taken contradictory positions on the issue, most recently in BristolMyers Squibb itself.289 The mélange approach occupies a middle ground

284
See Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1, 18–19
(1998) (describing common concerns about the effects of forum shopping); Christopher A. Whytock, The
Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 486 (2011) (explaining that forum shopping
requires the availability of more than one court).
285
See Norwood, supra note 147, at 304, 333 (arguing that forum shopping harms “public perceptions”
of the justice system). But see Debra L. Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 370–73 (2006)
(arguing that forum shopping is merely a product of a “lawyer’s obligation [to] zealously . . . protect and
pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law” (citation omitted)).
286
See Basset, supra note 285, at 370 (“In light of differences in state law, lawyers not only do, in fact,
check for the most favorable applicable law, but diligent and ethical legal practice requires consideration of
this factor.”).
287
See Norwood, supra note 147, at 269–70 (arguing that courts should be more aggressive in
employing forum non conveniens to deter attempts at forum shopping).
288
Compare Lea Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism: A
Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 854–55
(1985) (justifying personal jurisdiction limitations on sovereignty grounds), and Jeffrey M. Schmitt,
Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. L. REV. 769 (2016) (justifying
sovereignty limitations on personal jurisdiction through analogy to limitations on states imposing their
regulatory regimes beyond their borders), with Perdue, supra note 26, at 739 (“[T]he core inquiry in personal
jurisdiction is no longer a state-centered inquiry that focuses on the nature of state sovereignty, but rather a
defendant-centered inquiry.”).
289
Compare Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (citing Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)) (noting that limits on jurisdiction “are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States”), and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980) (explaining that due process “acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach
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between the positions of those who support state sovereignty as a basis for
personal jurisdiction limitations, and those who advocate other bases.290 A
strong argument can be made that a broader conception of personal jurisdiction
makes ignoring state borders easier; the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims in
Bristol-Myers Squibb have few—if any—connections to California,291 while
jurisdiction is reasonable under the mélange.292 However, a court applying the
mélange would do something that a court applying the Court’s current
approach does not: consider the forum state’s interest in litigating the dispute
as a coequal factor. Under the current approach, the forum state’s interest is not
considered until the court finds sufficient contacts between the defendant and
the forum state.293 Under an approach in which the typical personal jurisdiction
case is often decided on contacts alone, this means that the forum state’s
interest will not always be considered altogether.294 In contrast, a court
applying the mélange will always consider the forum state’s interest.295
3. Focusing on Fairness
By framing the personal jurisdiction analysis as a question of whether
jurisdiction is reasonable—not whether the defendant has sufficient contacts
with the forum—the mélange approach adopts a fairness-based view of due
process. Although the Court has consistently cast personal jurisdiction as a
matter of due process since Pennoyer,296 due process’s true role in personal

out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system”), with Ins.
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (noting that due process
“represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty”).
290
Compare McFarland, supra note 112, at 790–94 (arguing that the Court should replace its current
approach to personal jurisdiction with one that places greater emphasis on state borders), with Ins. Corp. of Ir.,
456 U.S. at 702 (explaining that limits on personal jurisdiction are not based on matters of sovereignty, but
rather on the need to protect a defendant’s “individual liberty interest”), and Perdue, supra note 26, at 743
(arguing that arguments based on sovereignty do not add to the analysis, and that “[a] more modest alternative
would be for the Court to stop invoking sovereignty as if it provided some analytical content”).
291
See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
292
See infra Section III.B.
293
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (explaining that the forum state’s
interest in the dispute may be considered only after “it has been decided that a defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts within the forum State”).
294
See Freer, supra note 39, at 572–73 (noting that “once there is a contact, jurisdiction is presumed
reasonable unless the defendant” meets the “strikingly onerous” burden of proving otherwise).
295
See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (recognizing California’s interest in
providing Californians a forum to sue nonpaying insurers); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,
647–48 (1950) (recognizing Virginia’s interest in adjudicating disputes involving Virginians’ insurance
policies); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (recognizing New York’s
interest in regulating trusts formed under its laws).
296
See supra note 27.
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jurisdiction remains the subject of debate.297 A procedural due process inquiry
generally revolves around whether a defendant receives two things: notice and
an opportunity to be heard.298 At the heart of this inquiry is ensuring a
modicum of fairness; something that the Court’s current approach only hints at
considering.299 The Court’s current approach to specific jurisdiction falls short
of properly considering fairness for two reasons. First, the Court has made it
very clear that only a showing of substantial unfairness can defeat
jurisdiction.300 And second, fairness cannot be considered at all until a contact
has been found.301 What this means is that it is possible for a plaintiff to be
unable to sue in an otherwise fair forum simply because the defendant’s
contacts with that forum are tenuous.302 It also gives the creative defendant an
incentive “to structure its distribution system and send products to all fifty
states, while avoiding the reach of any, or almost any, individual state’s
courts.”303 In contrast, the mélange makes fairness front and center in the
analytical process.304 As discussed above, the central question that the mélange
answers is not “does the defendant have sufficient contacts?” but rather “would
personal jurisdiction be reasonable, or fair, in this case?”305
Accordingly, returning personal jurisdiction to the mélange has three
significant advantages over the Court’s current inflexible approach. First, the
mélange’s more permissible view of whether jurisdiction is fair and reasonable
in a given case may discourage defendants from contesting jurisdiction, saving

297
See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 83 (arguing that the Court should abandon analyzing personal
jurisdiction as a matter of constitutional law altogether); Conison, supra note 112 (arguing that personal
jurisdiction differs from both procedural and substantive due process); Pfeffer, supra note 72 (arguing that
personal jurisdiction should be a matter of state rather than constitutional law).
298
Conison, supra note 112, at 1074; cf. McGee, 355 U.S. at 224 (citing Travelers, 339 U.S. 643) (noting
that although the defendant will be inconvenienced by litigating in California, “[t]here is no contention that
respondent did not have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and appear”).
299
See Conison, supra note 112, at 1188 (“Notice, opportunity to be heard, and fairness in decisionmaking are not [the Court’s current approach’s] subjects.”); see also Freer, supra note 39, at 572 (citing
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)) (noting that the Court only considers fairness
once contact has been found).
300
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (“[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities
at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of some
other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”).
301
See id. at 476–77 (explaining that fairness will not be considered until a contact is found).
302
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011); World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); see also Borchers, supra note 15, at 130 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s
interpretation of its ‘purposeful availment’ test often denies plaintiffs in tort cases access to the most rational
forum—in other words, the state of the injury.”).
303
Miller, supra note 23, at 475.
304
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
305
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.

DEMARTINI_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

846

4/23/2018 12:54 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:809

resources currently being spent disputing jurisdiction.306 The effect of avoiding
lengthy disputes over jurisdiction would help streamline litigation and
encourage access to the courts; both of these consequences would in turn assist
in making sure that more cases are resolved on their merits.307 Next,
consideration of the forum state’s interests in adjudicating a particular case
would also ensure that courts consider the states as separate sovereigns when
analyzing jurisdiction.308 Finally, returning personal jurisdiction to the mélange
would promote a fairness-based view of due process by making fairness the
central question to be asked and answered.309
B. Bristol-Myers Squibb Under the Mélange
As convoluted as the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Bristol-Myers
Squibb is,310 the analysis becomes much simpler when analyzed under the
mélange. Recall that a court applying the mélange will consider the nature of
the defendant’s contacts, the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the case, and
the burden on the parties and overall convenience of litigating in the forum,
and will decide from there whether jurisdiction is reasonable.311 Instead of
focusing on the nuances of whether a defendant’s interactions with a state are
“contacts” for the purposes of personal jurisdiction,312 courts applying the
mélange will consider the broader question of whether jurisdiction is fair.313
By examining the Bristol-Myers Squibb facts through a mélange lens, the
analysis becomes much clearer, and, ultimately, much fuller.
1. BMS’s Contacts with California
The extent of BMS’s contacts with California suggest that allowing the
nonresident plaintiffs’ claims to move forward would be reasonable. BMS has
a large footprint in California.314 From 2006 through 2012 alone it sold roughly
$1 billion worth of Plavix in the state.315 Because of these contacts, eighty-six

306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315

(2017).

See supra notes 260–73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 274–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 288–95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 296–305 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.2.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 886 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773
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California residents filed claims against BMS;316 even if jurisdiction were not
proper over the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims, BMS must litigate the California
residents’ claims where they were filed.317 However, the fact remains that the
nonresident plaintiffs’ injuries bear little, if any, connection to BMS’s
California activities.318 However, under the mélange, contacts—like any other
factor—are not alone dispositive.319 BMS has made such a large footprint in
California that it is reasonable for it to have to answer claims there.
2. California’s Interest in the Litigation
While the extent of BMS’s contacts with California suggest jurisdiction is
reasonable, it is less clear that a court applying the mélange would conclude
California has an interest in providing a forum for the nonresidents’ claims that
weighs in favor of litigating there.
On the one hand, California has an interest in providing a forum for the
nonresident plaintiffs’ claims. As the California Supreme Court noted in its
opinion,320 this interest stems from “California law[s] aimed at protecting
consumers from the potential dangers posed by prescription medication” that
regulate pharmaceutical manufacturers.321 The existence of state laws
regulating an industry have been influential in previous mélange cases; the
Court in Travelers, McGee, and Mullane referred to similar state regulations.322
California also has an interest in regulating entities that do business—
particularly entities that do as much business as BMS does—within its borders.
Beyond California’s interest in regulating BMS’s behavior, California has an
interest in providing a forum for its residents.323 In fact, California’s interest
goes beyond providing a forum for its own residents; it is also interested in
ensuring that its residents recover for their injuries.324 Two facts illustrate this
interest. First, keeping the California and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims
consolidated in one action would increase the amount of evidence available

316
317
318
319

Id. at 877–78.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (finding jurisdiction based on a single

contact).
320

Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 892–93.
Id. at 892; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 119400–119402 (West 2007).
322
See McGee, 355 U.S. at 224; Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647–48 (1950);
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
323
Cf. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (noting California’s interest in providing its residents a forum).
324
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 893.
321
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and would help develop an accurate factual record.325 Second, keeping the
claims consolidated protects the California plaintiffs from being shut out of a
recovery, as splitting the plaintiffs would encourage a “race to the
courthouse.”326
On the other hand, despite evidence of California’s interest in the litigation,
a court applying the mélange might conclude that this factor does not weigh in
favor of litigating the nonresidents’ claims in California. The comparisons
between Bristol-Myers Squibb and prior mélange cases are not flawless. While
the presence of state laws regulating the defendants’ activities was relevant in
prior mélange cases, the plaintiffs in those cases were at least citizens of the
states where they filed suit.327 Unlike the trusts in Mullane, which were
established under the law of the state where complaints were eventually
filed,328 BMS is incorporated in Delaware, not California.329 Although
California law regulates the behavior of pharmaceutical manufacturers such as
BMS, using these laws as a justification for regulating activities that occur
entirely outside California may raise horizontal federalism concerns.330 Thus it
is possible that a court looking at the facts of Bristol-Myers Squibb could
conclude that California lacks an interest in providing a forum for these claims
that makes it a preferable forum as compared to other states.
3. The Nonresidents’ Interest in Litigating in California
Similar to analyses of California’s interest in the litigation, courts applying
the mélange may differ in the weight that they give to the nonresidents’ interest
in litigating in California.
A court applying the mélange may find that the nonresident plaintiffs
obviously have an interest in litigating in California because they chose to file
suit there. If they felt otherwise, they would have filed elsewhere.331 The
nonresident plaintiffs also have a strong interest in keeping their claims
325
See id. at 892 (citing Ault v. Int’l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1153 (1974)) (noting the evidentiary
value of evidence of similar claims).
326
Id. at 893 (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2000)).
327
See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
328
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
329
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 883.
330
Horizontal federalism refers to the interactions between the laws of the various states. Heather K.
Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 60–61
(2014). One horizontal federalism concern relates to “spillovers,” situations where one state’s laws affect
citizens in another state. See id. at 61–62.
331
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 893 (describing the nonresidents’ interest in litigating in
California).
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consolidated, both amongst themselves and with the California residents; doing
so allows them to share both the costs and benefits of litigation amongst
themselves.332 As the California Supreme Court noted, splitting the litigation
would also incentivize a “race to the courthouse” among the plaintiffs,
presenting the possibility that some claims might be shut out by others.333 Thus
for the plaintiffs, both nonresident and resident, litigating in California furthers
their interests in seeking recovery from BMS.
Despite the nonresident plaintiffs’ interest in being able to litigate where
they choose, a court applying the mélange may find that this interest warrants
little weight. Two considerations are relevant here. First, a court may recognize
that the nonresident plaintiffs were engaging in forum shopping when they
filed their claims in California.334 Second, in contrast to the California
Supreme Court’s concern that the alternative to litigating all the claims in
California is to have them spread out over multiple forums, a court applying
the mélange may consider the fact that, under Daimler and Goodyear, general
jurisdiction over BMS with regard to all the Plavix claims could be obtained in
New York or Delaware.335
4. The Overall Convenience of Litigating All Claims in California
Comparing the relative positions of both sides in Bristol-Myers Squibb
demonstrates that the burden imposed on BMS by having to litigate in
California is slight. BMS is a large company with resources available to defend
against products liability claims.336 In contrast, the plaintiffs are a group of
individuals who likely banded together as a means of diffusing their costs.337
BMS will have to continue litigating the eighty-six California plaintiffs’ claims

332
Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (“[R]esidents would be at a severe
disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally
accountable.”); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648–49 (1950) (noting that “[h]ealth
benefit claims are seldom so large that Virginia policyholders could afford the expense and trouble of a
Nebraska law suit”).
333
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 893 (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 795–96 (9th Cir.
2000)). The court also noted that if litigation were split up, discovery disputes in other forums would cause
delays in California, directly affecting the California plaintiffs. Id.
334
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
335
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 883 (noting that BMS could not be “at home” in California
because it is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal places of business in New York and New Jersey).
336
See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Forbes recently listed BMS at number 234 on its list of
the world’s 2,000 largest public companies. The Just 100: America’s Best Corporate Citizens: Bristol-Myers
Squibb, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/bristol-myers-squibb/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
337
See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
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regardless of whether the nonresidents join them.338 Of course defending
against the nonresident claims in California burdens BMS.339 However, this
burden is mitigated by the fact that in the alternative—if the nonresidents’
claims were split—BMS would find itself litigating the same issues in multiple
states.340 Thus, BMS is in a better position to travel than the nonresident
plaintiffs are.
Finally, the overall convenience of allowing all the claims to move forward
together in California suggests that jurisdiction is fair and reasonable there.
The facts that point to consolidating the claims in California being an efficient
means to resolve the dispute have been mentioned before. Consolidating the
claims ensures that the factual record will be well-developed, which in turn
increases the odds that the dispute will arrive at a fair resolution.341 One risk of
splitting up the claims is the possibility that some plaintiffs will not be able to
recover while others will.342 If jurisdiction is to help address gaps between
rights and remedies, then similarly situated plaintiffs should have similar
opportunities to recover.343 Consolidation also avoids the potential discovery
delays that would be caused by concurrent litigation across several states.344
Finally, consolidating the claims in California is an efficient means of
resolving the dispute for BMS, as it avoids the costs of cumulative litigation
across multiple states.345
Considering the above factors, it is not clear whether asserting personal
jurisdiction over BMS in California is reasonable. Although BMS has made
extensive contacts with California over the years,346 and the burdens imposed
on BMS by having to litigate in California would be mitigated by the
efficiency of allowing a case to move forward where it was originally filed,347
reasonable courts could differ in how they approach California’s and the
nonresident plaintiffs’ interests in having this case litigated in California.348
338

See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 891.
340
Id. at 891–92. The burden is also mitigated by the fact that California law permits out-of-state
discovery. Id. at 892 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2026.010 (West Supp. 2018)).
341
See Subrin & Main, supra note 22, at 1878–79 (expressing concerns about underdeveloped records).
342
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 893 (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 795–96 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
343
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
344
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 894.
345
See id. at 891–92 (noting that the alternative to upholding jurisdiction in California is to litigate the
same claims over multiple forums).
346
See supra Section III.B.1.
347
See supra Section III.B.2.
348
See supra Sections III.B.2–3.
339
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What is clear is that under the mélange, the analysis of Bristol-Myers
Squibb becomes much more involved. Whereas California’s interest in the
litigation and the plaintiffs’ interest in litigating where they chose to file suit
are merely afterthoughts when examining this case through the current
personal jurisdiction framework,349 under the mélange they become the
dispositive factors in an analysis.
CONCLUSION
At its core, the California Supreme Court’s approach in Bristol-Myers
Squibb was a response to Daimler. With general jurisdiction limited by the
Supreme Court’s “at home” standard, the California Supreme Court sought to
expand specific jurisdiction by applying a “sliding scale” test for relatedness.
That backfired when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to adopt a narrower
definition. Many academics and practitioners will undoubtedly appreciate that
the Court stepped in to clarify its relatedness standard after decades of silence.
However, clarifying what it means for a claim to “arise out of or relate to”350 a
defendant’s contacts with the forum is a red herring. It solves the wrong
problem.
As this Comment argues, the problem with the Court’s current approach to
analyzing personal jurisdiction reaches deeper than the relatedness question.
The problem is a chronic overemphasis on finding a contact between the
defendant and the forum state before even considering whether jurisdiction
would be fair. Because of this emphasis, fairness has been all but removed
from the jurisdictional analysis. Solving relatedness will not solve this
problem. To address it, the Court must abandon its focus on contacts alone and
return to a mélange analysis.
Returning to the mélange would further several normative values that
modern civil procedure seeks to promote. First, the mélange’s fuller analysis of
whether jurisdiction is fair and reasonable in a case would reduce the number
of resources currently spent on pre-discovery litigation. This in turn would
both help streamline litigation and encourage access to the courts, making sure
that more cases are resolved on their merits. Consideration of the forum state’s
interests in adjudicating a case would also ensure that courts consider the states
as separate sovereigns when analyzing jurisdiction. Finally, returning personal

349
350

See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 377 P.3d at 891–94.
Id. at 886.
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jurisdiction to the mélange would promote a fairness-based view of due
process by making fairness the central question to be asked and answered.
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